

Jewish Americans

Computational Propaganda in the United States

Trends in anti-Semitic harassment and political disinformation on social media



ABSTRACT

How are Jewish Americans being impacted by anti-Semitism and political disinformation? Our mixed-methods study utilizes both qualitative interviews with Jewish Americans involved in US politics and a quantitative analysis of political discussions on Twitter prior to the 2018 midterm elections.

We identified two divergent and damaging trends that are impacting the Jewish American community. The first trend is the dramatic rise in anti-Semitic rhetoric and harassment online, which takes the form of anti-Semitic conspiracies, memes, and coordinated doxing campaigns aimed at intimidating outspoken Jewish leaders and activists. Concerningly, there has been a corresponding rise in offline anti-Semitism, lending credence to the fear that online hate is manifesting into offline violence. The second trend is increased partisan involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is aggravating divisions within the Jewish American community and inflaming intragroup harassment. The conversation around Israel and Palestine is marred with targeted abuse and disinformation, and the social media environment does not favor the necessary nuance, exacerbating polarization. This paper provides an in-depth investigation into these two trends.

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ABOUT THESE PAPERS

This case study series explores the social implications of computational propaganda. Each report outlines how tools and tactics including bots, disinformation and political harassment were used over social media in attempts to silence social and issue-focused groups prior to the 2018 US midterm elections.



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introduction

In 2015 and 2016, a series of stabbing attacks were carried out by Palestinians in Israel. The attackers were not part of an orchestrated campaign. They were young people—many under 20 years of age—inspired by viral Facebook videos calling previous attackers martyrs. They had viewed instructional online posts, that indicated an anatomical diagram of the human body indicating where to stab to in order to kill (Rudoren, 2017). A Jewish American, Richard Lakin, died after being stabbed and shot in one of the attacks (Avni, 2017). Lakin was a dedicated advocate for Israeli-Arab reconciliation and a founding member of the “Israel Loves Iran” initiative. He had taught both Arab and Israeli children English. His family sued Facebook for US\$1 billion for its role in inciting and glorifying terror (Goldman, 2016).

On April 27, 2019, a shooter opened fire in the Chabad of Poway synagogue in southern California on the final day of Passover, killing one person and wounding three (Medina, Mele & Murphy, 2019). The shooter, posted an anti-Semitic letter to 8chan, an anonymous message board often used by extremist groups, saying that Jews are “responsible for the meticulously planned genocide of the human race” (Gage, 2019). In the letter, he claimed responsibility for setting fire to Dar-ul-Arqam mosque in Escondido, CA. He praised the white supremacist terrorist who used Facebook Live to video broadcast his murderous rampage at two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand on March 15, 2019, in which 50 Muslim worshipers were killed and 50 more were injured (Owen, 2019). He also praised the white supremacist who killed eleven Jewish worshipers and injured six at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh on October 27, 2018. The Pittsburgh attack occurred after the shooter posted on Gab (an alt-right Twitter alternative) that a Jewish nonprofit, HIAS, was bringing in immigrant “invaders” to kill white people and that he wouldn’t “sit by and watch [his] people get slaughtered” (Owen, 2019; Gab archive).

Social media has become a tool used to glorify, incite, and inspire hate speech, hate crimes, and terrorist attacks. Derogatory tropes and conspiracies have festered in siloed message boards and become viral through hashtags, memes, and live streams. They have festered in siloed message boards. White supremacists and other terrorists have skillfully manipulated both

social media and mainstream media to gain visibility and inspire imitators. More and more often, hatred online has lead to hatred offline.

Present study

This report investigates the ways in which Jewish Americans were targeted with digital harassment and disinformation during the 2018 US midterm elections. It also explores the myriad challenges the community continues to face due, in part, to illicit uses of online tools. The report (like the others in this series) is intended to humanize the impacts of computational propaganda—the use of algorithms and automation to manipulate public opinion on social media. Our research includes both in-depth, qualitative interviews with Jewish Americans and quantitative analysis of Twitter data related to the 2018 US contest.

In the course of our qualitative research, we interviewed seventeen Jewish Americans involved in US politics. The interviewees represented a range of ages, races, denominations, and political alignments. They described a spike in vicious targeted online and offline harassment accompanied by general unease with the direction of US discourse around Jewish issues. They reported that they feel this trend has continued to grow after the 2016 election, which not only emboldened extremist right-wing groups, but also led to increased American involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Our interviewees told us that they, and their Jewish American friends and family, feel alienated and silenced—drowned out by roaring partisans. Those who do speak up and actively participate in politics say that they risk targeted online harassment by extremists, ranging from violent death threats to barrages of Nazi imagery.

Our quantitative analysis involved the study of 99,075 tweets pertaining to US politics, that also contained at least one of the 54 terms we hypothesized to be anti-Semitic. The terms were then reviewed in the context of the tweets and classified as “derogatory” (anti-Semitic > 85%); “lean derogatory” (85% > anti-Semitic > 50%); “context dependent” (anti-Semitic < 50%); “neutral” (related to Jewish people, but not anti-Semitic); or “irrelevant” (< 10% of tweets related to Jewish people). Across the sample of 99,075 tweets, irrelevant terms

background

are the most common (31.55% of tweets), followed by context dependent terms (29.94%), derogatory terms (28.13%), lean derogatory terms (18.32%), and lastly, neutral terms (1.98%) (Table 1, page 9). Several tweets contain more than one term category. Tweets that were marked both as pertaining to anti-Semitism (derogatory, lean derogatory, and context dependent) and as referring to a conspiracy (“Illuminati” tweets were excluded as they did not explicitly target or accuse Jews) make up a shocking 54.10% of tweets. Assessing hashtags by category, 57.29% of conservative hashtag tweets contained either a derogatory or lean derogatory term, compared to only 36.62% of liberal hashtag tweets (Table 3, page 10). Additionally, regarding automated (bot) accounts, of accounts that had tweeted at least one derogatory or lean derogatory term, 18.29% are estimated to be automated, compared to only 10.87% of accounts that did not tweet any derogatory or lean derogatory terms (Table 4, page 10). Additionally, three themes required deeper analysis: (1) unexpected term usage, (2) age-old anti-Semitic companies, and (3) the Zionist and anti-Zionist divide.

The qualitative and quantitative studies revealed a hostile social media environment. They revealed (1) conspiracies that normalize anti-Semitic opinions and provoke violent anti-Semitic acts, (2) targeted harassment campaigns orchestrated by far-right leaders, and (3) increasingly partisan and divisive conversations relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that are not given adequate context and nuance in the viral, emotion-exploiting information spaces of social media.

Although their experiences and outlooks vary widely, our interview subjects all reported that their lives, both online and offline, have been shaped by the realities of modern anti-Semitism. Some have been targeted by various far-right groups directly, some have watched hate wax and wane across the decades, and some argue that hate has shaped the digital ecosystem their generation has grown up in. They spoke about the external pressures forced on the Jewish community and the internal cracks they see appearing. They see these issues, generally, as intimately connected to growing rancor over Israel and the rise of extremist politics on the right and the left—all connected, most argue, to the rise of Donald Trump.

Anti-Semitism remains a persistent issue in the United States, with 10% of adults in 2015 holding many anti-Semitic beliefs and 33% believing that Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the US (“ADL,” 2015). Furthermore, anti-Semitic incidents in the US are on the rise, with a whopping 57% increase in 2017 to 1,986 incidents (“Audit of Anti-Semitic Incidents,” 2018). On college campuses alone, there was a 258% increase in white supremacist propaganda (“ADL College Campuses,” 2018), and schools were the most common location of anti-Semitic incidents. This worrying trend extends to social media, with researchers finding an average increase in anti-Semitic tweets over 2017 (“Quantifying Hate: A Year of Anti-Semitism on Twitter,” 2018). The problem is particularly dire for Jewish Americans in the public eye, with at least 800 journalists receiving anti-Semitic tweets between August 2015 and July 2016, and with these anti-Semitic tweets receiving over 45 million impressions (ADL, 2016). Notably, 60% of these were replies to journalists’ posts and 29% retweets, suggesting a reactive quality to anti-Semitic Twitter attacks, an aspect supported by global studies (Jakubowicz et al., 2017). The tweets analyzed often came from users with far-right or pro-Trump terms in their bios. In recent years the far-right has seen an explosion of activity online, much of it anti-Semitic.

Online hate websites have been around for decades (Borgeson & Valeri, 2004), but they have grown and metastasized since 2016. Between July 2016 and January 2018, an analysis of over 100 million posts on Gab and 4chan’s Politically Incorrect imageboard found that the use of the terms “Jew” and “Kike” more than doubled on 4chan and increased on Gab (Finkelstein et al., 2018). Furthermore, the analysis found that fringe sites spread anti-Semitic memes, such as grotesque Jewish caricatures, into more mainstream websites, such as Facebook and Twitter. Notably, online anti-Semitism comes not only from the far-right but also from the far-left and hardcore anti-Zionists, creating an overlap between extremist groups (Hamelmann et al., 2017).

While tech companies' hate speech standards have undeniably improved over time ("Responding to Cyberhate," 2016), there is still more to be done to keep companies accountable. Social networks break down previous barriers to social interaction. Despite the many positive effects of that process, it also enables online hate mobbing and harassment (Balica, 2017). Online hate has a real effect not only on prominent figures who are directly targeted, but also on ordinary users of social media. An estimated 53% of young Americans have been exposed to online hate, and their likelihood of encountering hate is correlated with their social network use (Hawdon et al., 2017). Online harassment seriously affects the ability of victims to participate in social and political discourse, with 30% of users who have received serious harassment, such as threats, choosing to stop using an online service (Duggan, 2017). As such, it is clear that online anti-Semitism is growing rapidly in quantity and pervasiveness, and that the harassment this hate brings causes real harm to Jewish American participation in online discourse.

methods

The intention of this study is to understand the impact of targeted harassment and disinformation campaigns on Jewish Americans' experiences within the US political sphere. To comprehend the personal ramifications for individuals and overarching trends across social media, we conducted both qualitative interviews and a quantitative analysis of political tweets. As such, our methodology and analysis are divided into two sections: interviews and Twitter analysis.

Interview methodology

We conducted in-depth interviews with seventeen Jewish Americans of varying ages, gender identities, races, political orientations, and denominational affiliations who are involved in American politics. Interviewees include elected officials, political candidates, policymakers, academics, activists, journalists, consultants, and commentators. The interviews were conducted throughout September 2018

and March 2019. Extensive timestamped notes were taken throughout the interviews, which subsequently informed empirically driven thematic memos. The memos reflect the observations and analyses of the interviewer, outline prominent themes concerning computational propaganda and disinformation, and include verbatim quotations. Given the sensitivity of this study, the identities of all interview participants are strictly anonymous and are known only to the researcher who conducted the interviews.

Twitter analysis methodology

Desiring to capture a snapshot of political conversation on Twitter in the leadup to the 2018 US midterm elections, we used snowball sampling to collect a sample of political hashtags. This methodology of hashtag collection aligns with previous and ongoing research on Twitter conversations (Kollanyi et al., 2016; Woolley & Guilbeault, 2016; Woolley, 2018). Our initial randomly collected hashtag sample contained 228 hashtags, which were categorized by political leaning: conservative, liberal, extremist, Zionist/anti-Zionist, and neutral (e.g., #vote) (Appendix I). Using Tweepy—an open-source library of the coding language Python, which is used to access the Twitter API—we collected 5,843,282 tweets containing the chosen hashtags. Due to constraints upon Tweepy, the tweets were gathered in groups between August 31 and September 17, 2018. As this is a study of how Jewish Americans are discussed in the general Twitter debate concerning US politics, the majority of hashtags studied are associated with liberal and conservative issues, and a minority are related to extremist ideology or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

We assembled a carefully selected collection of 54 terms that we hypothesized would be used in anti-Semitic discussion about Jewish Americans on Twitter (Appendix II). As there is no up-to-date glossary of all anti-Semitic terms—particularly code words and slang used in anti-Semitic discussions online—we gathered terms from 4chan and 8chan and from literature on anti-Semitism (ODIHR, 2018), and we consulted with an anti-Semitism expert at the Anti-Defamation League (ADL). Using Python, the collected terms were then

filtered through the tweet sample. Of the 5,843,282 tweets, 99,075 tweets contained at least one of the terms. Upon human review of the terms in the context of the tweets, the terms were then classified as “derogatory” (anti-Semitic > 85%); “lean derogatory” (85% > anti-Semitic > 50%); “context dependent” (anti-Semitic < 50%); “neutral” (related to Jewish people, but not anti-Semitic); and “irrelevant” (< 10% of tweets related to Jewish people). Additionally, it was noted whether or not the term was used in reference to an anti-Semitic conspiracy. We worked to be non-partisan in our selection of hashtags and terms during our analyses, although we acknowledge true positivism is not possible in social scientific research.

To assess the impact of automated (bot) accounts, Twitter accounts that tweeted at least one “derogatory” or “lean derogatory” term were analyzed in Botometer in comparison to accounts that had never tweeted a “derogatory” or “lean derogatory” term. Botometer is a machine learning dashboard that works to classify Twitter bots. It was created by the Observatory on Social Media (OSoME), a joint project through the Network Science Institute (IUNI) and the Center for Complex Networks and Systems Research (CNetS) at Indiana University. It builds upon a previous iteration of the tool, known as BotorNot, to scan accounts for automation using a variety of measures and signals, and is arguably the academic industry standard in Twitter bot detection (Davis et al., 2016).

results: qualitative interviews with jewish americans

Although the interview subjects were of diverse backgrounds and held diverse and divergent views, there were significantly consistent themes throughout. The seven main themes are: (1) division between Israel and Palestine is increasing; (2) debate over Israel and Palestine has become a politically partisan issue in the US; (3) suspected coordinated online campaigns are exacerbating Israel-Palestine debate; (4) interviewees are saying that they face the worst harassment from other Jewish people; (5) trolling and harassment from the far-right have increased since the 2016 US elections; (6) the line between extreme anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism is becoming blurred, putting progressive Jewish Americans on uncertain footing; and (7) as the Jewish American population becomes more diverse and elevates the voices of diverse Jews, intersectionality offers opportunity for solidarity with other minority groups.

Israel-Palestine debate is “a toxic conversation”

Twelve of the seventeen interview subjects claimed that the Israel-Palestine debate was at the center of their experiences with disinformation and harassment. Both Zionists and anti-Zionists found themselves harassed for their views, and many believe that the debate is becoming uglier as American politics polarizes. One subject told us that “a particularly partisan, bitter fight among Jewish Americans has been on Israel,” creating “a super-hostile atmosphere even within Jewish communities.” Both sides of the debate feel under attack. A pro-Israel subject claimed that “the new anti-Semitism is harassment of anyone who has a veneer of religiosity in the form of support for Israel”, and an anti-Zionist subject claimed that “the Jewish Americans being attacked online are anti-Zionists who are attacked by Zionists in organized campaigns.” There was a general perception that the discourse has worsened to the point of being “a toxic conversation.”

Israel-Palestine debate has become increasingly partisan since 2016

Although rancor over Israeli issues is hardly new, many interviewees felt that the problem has become particularly bad for Jewish Americans since 2016. Since his election, President Trump has vocally aligned himself with Israel, and with Benjamin Netanyahu's right-wing administration in particular. As such, Israeli issues are falling victim to America's general post-2016 polarization. One subject claimed that "Israel has become a culture war issue, kind of like abortion, gay marriage, and the death penalty." Another explained that "the divisiveness and split in the Jewish community has worsened." Many liberal subjects were uncomfortable with the association between support for Israel and support for Republican policies, arguing that there should not be a contradiction between liberalism and Zionism. A Democratic political candidate experienced harassment from those who "don't consider me left and hate me for being pro-Israel." She mentioned that "it has always been difficult to vocally come out in support of or against Israel, because you get attacked so easily," and that it is difficult to communicate a nuanced position regarding a two-state solution—"pro-Israel or pro-Palestine, either one or the other." Another interviewee said, "there are too many of us forced into being an activist or a Zionist, and it's a difficult choice. It's become so binary, so broken." An anti-Trump, Orthodox interviewee was equally displeased, claiming that "Because Trump is so upfront about Israel, [people think] if you are pro-Israel, you must be pro-Trump and there is no discussion, you must be destroyed." It is evidently a worrying experience for Jewish Americans to see Israeli issues move, in the eyes of some, from a question of deep relevance and nuance to Jews, to a mere marker of American partisan affiliation.

Coordinated disinformation campaigns suspected of exacerbating Israel-Palestine debate

Many interviewees suspected the existence of organized disinformation campaigns designed to sow discord among Jews or to attack Jews on the other side of the Israel debate. One subject told us that "it is incredibly troubling to me that Israel has become a political issue and that it has worsened in the past few years. This is due to coordinated disinformation campaigns." Another subject believed that "there are

coordinated misinformation campaigns conducted by Jewish organizations, trying to propagandize Jews." He believes these campaigns are organized by Zionists against anti-Zionists, but that the end result is that moderate Jewish Americans feel unrepresented and "alienated." An additional interviewee claimed that while "both sides employ disinformation in order to augment their platforms, I think this has been a very conscious effort on behalf of the current right-wing Israeli government to ply American Jews away from the Democrats, which they see as less friendly towards their administration." A pro-Israel Democratic politician said that "a lot of the attacks are from the same organizations" using stock phrases—"same phrase, always 'the murdering of Palestinian children.'" She receives these attacks from uncannily similar accounts—"mainly women who say they are Jewish in their profile...I'm very skeptical." These accounts often have aspects which suggest to her they are automated or inauthentic, such as their pictures or creation date. Few participants believed that automated accounts played a role in their personal experiences; some instead talked about what one interviewee called "non-bot Twitter mobs," which are activated when aggrieved by specific posts or articles. It can be difficult to draw a clear line between an active propaganda campaign and the anger it stirs in partisan social media users, but they are both unacceptable to the victims of harassment.

Main source of harassment is other Jewish people

The partisan wounds opened by polarization and the social media ecosystem were felt particularly deeply by our interviewees when they divided the Jewish community itself. One subject claimed that "the only harassment I get is from other Jews," often Israelis, and that "liberal Jews seem to think that those standing with Trump and Netanyahu are going against the core values of what it means to be Jewish...and the right wing has gotten to the point of calling out the left wing as not Jewish." Another said, "I am more afraid of other Jews than of non-Jews...I am concerned for the survival of the Jewish people in America. We are more at risk of imploding internally than from the outside." This divide has in part opened up along the branches of modern Judaism, with one interviewee having seen "a real, stark divide form between Orthodox and non-Orthodox Jews over support and opposition to Trump." He believes

this divide is worsening as moderate Jews feel forced to “choose a side.” A politically left-wing Orthodox professor claimed that her Orthodox students “talked about the violence they felt, just from participating in political comment threads...they were really traumatized.” All of our interviewees who spoke about divides within the Jewish community considered this a seriously problematic trend. As complex discourse is replaced by rigid partisanship, the Jewish community is in danger of losing the solidarity which sustained it for thousands of years.

The rise of far-right trolling following the 2016 election

While only some of the more prominent subjects we interviewed had been the direct targets of far-right harassment, all interviewees were aware of the rise of far-right anti-Semitism online. Concerns about being targeted were most serious for interviewees whose positions in media or politics brought them to the attention of far-right ringleaders like David Duke and Andrew Anglin. Several interviewees had been doxxed by far-right leaders—their personal phone numbers, emails, home addresses, and their loved ones’ contact information were publicly released to armies of coordinated trolls. One candidate for office who spoke out against the far-right received “tens of thousands” of messages—from rape threats to pictures of her face on a lampshade. The harassment became so severe that she required police protection. Another, who was retweeted by David Duke, faced an “overwhelming” storm of “hate messages and tweets.” She argues that “hate has always been around, but having this president and people who are part of his administration who are hateful have created a safe place for the hateful to come out...it has only made it easier for people who already hate Jews.” Most interviewees believe that far-right anti-Semitism has become far more visible after the 2016 election—although one, an expert in far-right extremism, counseled that “over the last 30 or 40 years we have seen the ‘nazification’ of the American far-right. Recently, Jews have become the primary enemy the radical right sees as behind other evils.” Subjects also noted differences between particular groups of right-wing harassers: white nationalist anti-Semites, who prefer vitriol and Holocaust imagery; conspiracy theorists, who

talk about the manipulative cabal of Jewish bankers and the “puppeteer” George Soros; and mainstream conservatives, who use vilification and sexism (but rarely explicit anti-Semitism) to attack interviewees after they have been on *Fox News*—who rarely hide behind anonymity and are unafraid and unashamed of using their real names.

Generally, our interviewees did not believe that the far-right is growing massively in size, but asserted that those who hold anti-Semitic beliefs have become emboldened by the rise of the so-called alt-right and the election of Donald Trump. One interviewee, an expert researcher, argued that “those that are racist are louder and more empowered—they are empowered by our leader,” but that “the backlash [against hate] is greater.” He noted that, according to opinion polls, positive sentiments towards Jews and Muslims are increasing across America. Albeit, he was the lone optimistic interviewee. Another, who referred to her experience as a Jew of color, told us that “people have been given a license to not only express, but to act on their hate.” In reference to the communal divide mentioned earlier, one interviewee said, “I think Donald Trump has pitted Jews against each other...and that makes us more at risk to be targeted.” One commentator mentioned that he receives anti-Semitic attacks when he criticizes right-wing economics, pointing out, “they are really attacking me for my economic views,” but “right-wing partisans know that using anti-Semitic language is a way to antagonize Jewish writers.” This perilous recurrence of old and vicious prejudice, and its weaponization online to harass or silence Jewish voices, demands a response “at every level of society—civil society, government, schools, businesses, tech.” Hate can, however, make for strange bedfellows. One subject, who is sometimes exposed to the alt-right internet, sees anti-Semites breaking with Trump over his Israel policy. “If they’re attacking Trump, 99% of the time it’s because of Israel—they say he’s owned by Israel, that his family are Jews, they photoshop Stars of David on him.” Another, who is transsexual, noticed the irony in *The Daily Stormer’s* attacks on her, saying that “there’s something beautiful about hatred of transsexuals bringing together Nazis and Orthodox Jews, a real Kumbaya moment.”

Blurred line between extreme anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism

The majority of our interviewees considered themselves liberal or progressive. However, many claimed they felt less comfortable than before in progressive spaces, as an aggressively anti-Zionist far-left begins to blur the line between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism. A professor said that she guards her speech carefully, as she is “living in a time of right-wing attacks but, even more, feel[s] vulnerable to left-wing call-outs.” One liberal interviewee claimed that “the progressive wing of liberalism has become so over-sensitized” to Israel issues, arguing that “you can condemn anti-Semitism and also be against anti-Arab or anti-Muslim sentiment.” Another, a Democratic candidate “got a note that said, ‘voting for [her] is like spitting on the grave of a Palestinian child,’ and that was from people that [she] worked with and stood arm in arm with and learned the meaning of organizing from, not some anonymous troll.” She points out that this issue is an example of “horseshoe rhetoric,” where the far-right and the far-left arrive at similar extremist positions on an issue.

This was an issue on which some of our interview subjects disagreed completely, with one saying, “the people on the left are not doing Judaism” and another claiming that “anti-Semitism accusations are used to shut down anti-Zionist speech.” However, many subjects used some variant of “both sides” seeing anti-Semitism on both extremes of the Israel-Palestine debate. One argued that, while it is perfectly reasonable to support Israel without supporting its current government, “both the far-right and the far-left are trying to erase this nuance.” He also pointed out that the populist right and the left also agree on “economic justice,” easily falling into stereotypes of the “rich Jew” or believing conspiracy theories that “George Soros or Janet Yellen” are manipulating the economy for the benefit of Jews.

The UK Labour Party was a common point of reference, with several subjects mentioning it and two calling it a “canary in the coalmine” for the Democratic Party. One said that “hating Israel and hating or attacking people who are wealthy and successful, well, those two things

tend to merge into attacking Jews.” As such, it is clear that even progressive Jews feel that the environment on the left is less inclusive of Jews, and that far-left anti-Semitism is at least an issue worthy of debate. Keeping anti-Semitism out of progressive movements is a laudable goal and, increasingly, a pressing one.

Intersectionality between diverse Jews and other minorities: opportunity for solidarity

As one of our subjects puts it, “Jews come in every size, shape, and color,” and our choice of interviewees reflects the diversity of Jewish America. The perspectives of Jews of color and Jewish relationships with other minority groups provide valuable insights in an era of resurgent racial division. One of our subjects was targeted by David Duke not only because of her Judaism, but also because she’s a Latina who’s helping migrant families. She finds that her social media posts rarely attract trolls unless the post mentions that she is Jewish or Latina. The harassment has become so predictable that she has “become used to these things, and even though it shouldn’t be that way, it becomes part of the political life.” Another subject, a long-time advocate for Jews of color, says that she sees a lot of discussion “about who is Jewish, who looks Jewish,” but that “Jews are everywhere—we’re in the fabric of American society...in every corner of American life, from the bottom to the top.”

One interviewee says that she has “noticed more Jews of color willing to speak up and being able to name their experiences of anti-Semitism and racism,” but that many do not speak up for fear of harassment from inside or outside the community. She believes that Trump and the right have turned other minority groups against Jews and have “pitted Jews against people of color.” Hearteningly, the younger Jews of color in our sample did not report discrimination or harassment from within the community, with the exception of student Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) groups, some of whom may be Jewish. As the demographics of American Judaism broaden, new generations may cement Jewish solidarity with other victims of prejudice.

results: quantitative twitter analysis

Seeking to understand the ways in which Jewish people and terms related to Judaism are discussed in conversations related to US politics and the 2018 midterm elections, we analyzed 5,843,282 tweets. The tweets were gathered based on their association with a collection of political hashtags that were randomly collected and subsequently categorized (Appendix I). The tweets were then analyzed to see if they contained terms related to anti-Semitism (Appendix II). Of the 5,843,282 tweets, 99,075 tweets (1.70%) contained at least one of the terms. The term-containing tweets were then assessed by human reviewers to ascertain whether or not the terms were actually anti-Semitic or relevant to Jewish people.

Human review of tweets and term categorization

Upon extensive review of the 99,075 term-containing tweets, the terms were categorized as “derogatory” (anti-Semitic > 85%); “lean derogatory” (85% > anti-Semitic > 50%); “context dependent” (anti-Semitic < 50%); “neutral” (related to Jewish people, but not anti-Semitic); and “irrelevant” (< 10% of tweets related to Jewish people). Several terms (such as “Soros” and “Rothschild”) are involved in anti-Semitic conspiracies but are classified as “derogatory” because over 85% of the tweets containing the terms are anti-Semitic. See Appendix II for term incidence and categorization. It is important to note that the categorization of terms is specific to the 99,075 tweets we studied, not to the terms in general. Many of the terms, such as “1488” and “heil,” are often considered anti-Semitic, but were not used in anti-Semitic contexts in this sample (e.g. “1488” occurred 3 times, two of which were tweets that happened to have the number 1488 in them). Additionally, it goes without saying, our sample of 52 terms is not exhaustive.

Term incidence

Across the sample of 99,075 tweets, irrelevant terms were the most common (31.55% of tweets), followed by context dependent terms (29.94%), derogatory terms (28.13%), lean derogatory terms (18.32%), and lastly, neutral terms (1.98%). (Table 1). Several tweets contained more than one of term. Tweets that were marked both as pertaining to anti-Semitism (derogatory, lean derogatory, and context dependent) and referenced a conspiracy (“Illuminati” tweets were excluded as they did not explicitly target or accuse Jews) made up a shocking 54.1% of tweets. This is due, in part, to the prominence of references to George Soros, which were overwhelmingly anti-Semitic (Table 2).

Table 1. Term category incidence.

Category	Percentage of Tweets (N = 99,075)
Derogatory	28.13%
Lean Derogatory	18.32%
Context Dependent	29.94%
Neutral	1.98%
Irrelevant	31.55%
Anti-Semitic Conspiracy	54.1%

Table 2. Top 10 terms.

Term	Category	Number of Tweets
Soros	Derogatory	25,137
Nazi	Irrelevant	21,793
Globalist	Lean Derogatory	16,237
Hitler	Irrelevant	7,055
Israeli	Context Dependent	6,651
Shill	Context Dependent	4,902
globalism	Context Dependent	4,362
Jewish	Context Dependent	2,917
Jew	Context Dependent	2,721
Holocaust	Context Dependent	2,585

As far as term incidence across hashtags, hashtags that were categorized as conservative contain the largest number of tweets containing derogatory and lean derogatory terms (35,792 tweets), while neutral hashtags (“#PrimaryDay,” “#2018Midterms”) surprisingly contain the largest percentage of derogatory and lean derogatory terms (67% of tweets) (Table 3). While hashtags related to Zionist and anti-Zionist conversations contain the smallest percentage of derogatory tweets (0.48%), they contain significantly more context dependent tweets (80.70%). Given the ways in which terms were categorized (Appendix II), this is consistent.

Automated accounts and suspended accounts

We used Botometer to compare automation rates between accounts that have tweeted at least one tweet containing a derogatory or lean derogatory term, and accounts that have not tweeted any derogatory or lean derogatory terms. We found that 24,848 accounts had tweeted derogatory or lean derogatory terms, and 29,689 had not. An estimated 18.29% of derogatory/lean derogatory accounts are automated, compared to only 10.87% of non-derogatory accounts (Table 4). We also compared how many accounts were suspended or deleted between August 31, 2018 and March 15, 2019.

More derogatory accounts had been suspended than non-derogatory (4.70% compared to 4.02%), but more non-derogatory accounts had been deleted (5.35% compared to 5.02%). Overall, the majority of accounts spreading anti-Semitic ideas were accounts operated by human users without the aid of automation and only 4.70% of them have been suspended (Table 4).

Anti-Semitic themes across Twitter

Human review of the tweets revealed a number of unexpected findings. Firstly, there were terms that we hypothesized would be anti-Semitic, but were in fact rarely used in reference to Jewish people or Judaism and/or were used in ways that are contrary to what was expected. Secondly, age-old anti-Semitic tropes and conspiracies are flourishing, particularly among Twitter users that identify as Republicans and/or supporters of President Trump. And, thirdly, the Zionist/anti-Zionist debate was prevalent, including conversations around US political activists Linda Sarsour and Louis Farrakhan. The repetition of these names is due in part to the “breaking news” issues during the time period the tweets were collected.

Table 3. Term incidence by hashtag category.

Hashtag	Total Tweets	Derogatory (%)	Lean Derogatory (%)	Context Dependent (%)	Irrelevant (%)	Neutral (%)	Combined Derogatory (%)
Conservative	62,477	32.04	25.25	20.39	20.56	1.77	57.29
Liberal	24,009	34.60	2.02	17.11	44.62	1.66	36.62
Extremist	19,813	19.18	9.23	30.17	40.92	0.5	28.42
Neutral	14,956	49.85	17.25	16.76	13.64	2.49	67.10
Zionist or anti-Zionist	10,719	0.48	13.42	80.70	2.20	3.20	13.90

Table 4. Automation, suspension, and deletion.

Twitter Account	# Accounts	Automated (%)	Suspended (%)	Deleted (%)
Derogatory	24,848	18.29	4.70	5.02
Normal	29,689	10.87	4.02	5.35

Unexpected term usage

Upon human review, several terms that we initially hypothesized would be classified as “derogatory” were used very rarely, if at all, in relation to Jewish people, let alone in anti-Semitic contexts: “sieg,” “heil,” “Aryan,” and “reich.” We thought that the terms “sieg” and “heil” would be used in tweets that were derogatory towards Jews or in praise of Hitler; but in most instances they were used to mockingly criticize Donald Trump and Republicans, with no reference to Jewish people. A small number of tweets would appear to be in praise of Hitler, but upon further investigation were critiquing Donald Trump (e.g., a tweet stating, “SIEG HEIL, MEIN FÜHRER! #NAZIS” that was posted by a user with a bio that said “#impeachandremove #individual1 from office”). Similarly, the term “Aryan” was not used to extol white pride, but rather to criticize Donald Trump and Republicans (e.g., calling *Fox News* “aryan barbie neo-nazi propoganda trumpbecile brainwashing”). Likewise, “reich” was used by Trump supporters primarily to criticize the media and Democrats (Figure 1), or by Trump opposers to disparage Trump and Republicans (e.g., calling the right wing the “reich wing” and the alt-right the “alt-reich”). Strangely, followers of QAnon—a conspiracy theory alleging that Donald Trump, with the

secret assistance of Robert Mueller and the military, will arrest all members of the pedophilic “deep state”—repeatedly accused politicians and celebrities of being part of the “globalist NWO 4th reich.” This is paradoxical in that the term “globalist” is used in reference to the New World Order (NWO) conspiracy, which is often viewed through an anti-Semitic lens. As such, “reich” is being used to criticize Jewish “globalists” by equating them with Nazis (Figure 2). Additionally, 29.17% of the tweets were quoting Robert Reich, a well-known political commentator, and 13.45% of the “Reich” tweets were not in English.

Furthermore, the terms “Nazi,” “Hitler,” and “neo-Nazi,” which we hypothesized would be “context dependent” terms, were very rarely used in reference to Jewish people or Judaism, and thus were surprisingly classified as “irrelevant.” The vast majority of tweets using the terms “Nazi,” “Hitler,” and/or “neo-Nazi” were either in defense of Trump (Figure 3, page 12); to discredit Trump (e.g., “@realdonaldtrump has been compared to hitler by world leaders. he’s also threatened war, incited violence, endorsed sexual assault, defended nazis and our enemies, and inspires the kkk. how can he be allowed to seat someone on the supreme

Figure 1. “Reich” used to criticize the left.



Botometer score of user: 3.5/5; 32% Complete Automation Probability

Figure 2. Paradoxical combination of “reich” and “globalist.”



Botometer score of user: 1.7/5; 3% Complete Automation Probability

court?#resist #kavanaugh”); to assail the media; or to deflect allegations against Trump through the criticism of liberals (Figure 4). Antifa, in particular, was repeatedly accused of being Nazi-like (Figure 5). This is ironic because their name is short for “antifacist,” and they were founded with the belief that the Nazis wouldn’t have come to power if there had been organized counterprotesters in the 1920s and 1930s (ADL, 2019).

Figure 3. “Nazi” used in defense of Trump.



Botometer score of user: 0.2/5; 0% Complete Automation Probability

Figure 4. Deflecting criticism of Trump.



Botometer score of user: 1.3/5; 2% Complete Automation Probability

“Nazi,” “Hitler,” and “neo-Nazi” were by and large only used as tools to defame and insult Democrats and Republicans, as well as to decry the increased rise in white supremacist activity. They were used as anti-Semitic insults extremely rarely.

Age-old anti-Semitic conspiracies

Gaining prominence in the early 1900s, *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* inflamed the conspiracy that a cabal of powerful Jewish leaders are plotting to enslave mankind and destroy Christianity (Webman, 2012). *The Protocols* were used to blame the Jews following the 1917 Russian Revolution, and Hitler invoked them to justify early anti-Semitic laws (Webman, 2012). The conspiracy—with a contemporary twist focused primarily on philanthropist George Soros—has resurged, infecting the sectors of the US public through the vector of social media. An astonishing 54.10% of tweets in our sample of 99,075 contained references to anti-Semitic conspiracies—chiefly alleging that George Soros controls a “deep state” made up of politicians (across the globe and across the US political aisle) bent on destabilizing white European countries with floods of immigrants, economic crises, and media meant to corrupt minds against Christianity.

Figure 5. “Nazi” used to criticize Antifa.




Botometer score of user: 0.5/5; 0% Complete Automation Probability

Figure 6, which was shared on Twitter, is representative of how George Soros is viewed by many anti-Semitic conspiracy theorists. Tens of thousands of tweets claimed George Soros to be the mastermind and “the face of the deep state”—repeatedly insinuating or outright stating that his money allows him to control the world. The narrative that Soros pays anti-Trump protesters was often repeated (Figure 7). The term “billionaire” occurred 1,634 times, primarily in reference to Soros. Billionaires Tom Steyer (whose father is Jewish) and Michael Bloomberg (who is Jewish) were also mentioned in anti-Semitic tweets, but far less frequently (363 times and 24 times, respectively, in comparison to Soros’ 25,137 mentions). The Rothschild family, too, was cited 1,059 times in anti-Semitic tweets. Followers of QAnon in particular have adhered to anti-Semitic conspiracies.

There is a sub-conspiracy that George Soros is a Nazi (Figure 8). Although fringe (only 192 tweets claimed that Soros was either a Nazi or aligned with Hitler), it seems counterintuitive. Drawing from the tweets, there are two possible explanations: (1) it is an additional characteristic to make him appear all the more evil (e.g., “soros supported the nazis and turned people like sophie over to them. shame on that horrible man!”);

Figure 6. Anti-Semitic depiction of George Soros.



Botometer score of user: 2.4/5; 9% Complete Automation Probability

Figure 7. George Soros pays protesters.



Botometer score of user: 1.1/5; 1% Complete Automation Probability

Figure 8. Claim: George Soros is a Nazi.



Botometer score of user: 3.9/5; 45% Complete Automation Probability

(2) it is evidence that the Nazis were controlled by the Jewish cabal all along (e.g. “@stormisuponus rothschilds funded hitler. soros helped hitler murder countless and funded antifa. chain of evil is methodically being obliterated by @realdonaldtrump & military. god bless our president #qanon”). In the tweets, all terrible things are attributed to Soros. In reference to the murder of Heather Heyer at the 2017 Unite the Right rally, there was a tweet that was shared 173 times (since removed) that said: “charlottesville killer was clinton supporter, funded by soros.” The villainous framing of Soros is extended to other “globalists” and other members of the “deep state” (such as Barack Obama and John McCain), who are depicted across the majority of conspiracy-related tweets as agents of Satan, while Trump is depicted as an agent of God. Fears of the desecration of Christianity, the debilitation of the United States, and white genocide spur anti-Semitic conspiracy adherents onward with righteous hatred.

The Zionist and anti-Zionist debate

As highlighted in the qualitative interviews, tensions between Zionists and anti-Zionists have become both increasingly a part of US political discussion and increasingly partisan. The Republican Party has become a staunch ally of Prime Minister Netanyahu, with President Trump going so far as reversing 70 years of US policy in order to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel (Landler, 2017). The Democratic Party has faced fierce internal debate over the classification

of certain political statements and individuals as anti-Semitic. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is complex and emotionally challenging; as such, social media—where conversations are overly simplified, taken out of context, and emotional information is primed to spread virally—is arguably exacerbating the divide.

The tension between Zionists and anti-Zionists was evident in our Twitter data. In the sample of 99,075 tweets, 11.78% mentioned Israel or Israeli; 8.96% mentioned BDS; 7.14% mentioned Palestine or Palestinians; and 2.00% mentioned apartheid, which was overwhelmingly used in reference to Israel and Palestine. Interestingly, 1.92% of tweets mentioned Linda Sarsour, a co-chair of the Women’s March who is critical of Israel’s settlements in Palestine. The majority of the tweets about Sarsour (62.43%) were from one retweeted tweet that has since been deleted: “devout muslim, america hater (sorry for the redundancy) and democrat darling linda sarsour calls for people to stop ‘humanizing’ jews she’s a real peach #walkaway #maga.” Likewise, Louis Farrakhan was mentioned in only 199 tweets (0.2% of tweets), but 100% of the tweets about him were from Trump supporters (e.g. “steve bannon is no outright anti semitic evil bastard like #farrakhan the #clintons have no shame or moral conscience. go #trump and the true #patriots”). It appears that Republicans, intentionally or not, are using this division amongst Zionists and anti-Zionists to further divide Democrats.

conclusion

Since 2016, two divergent and damaging trends have harmed the Jewish American community. The first is the dramatic rise in online far-right and white supremacist harassment—used as a tool to suppress outspoken Jewish Americans through threats of violence and Nazi imagery—and a dramatic rise in offline vandalism, hate crimes, and terrorism. The second is increased partisan involvement with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—Republicans have increased their support for the government of Israel, and many Democrats have become increasingly aligned with Palestine. This has placed some liberal Jews in the uncomfortable position of feeling encircled by a strident right-wing that flirts with anti-Semitic extremists and a left-wing that demands they choose between progressive and Zionist principles. Furthermore, the nature of social media conversation—highly emotional, brief snippets that can be taken out of context—has arguably allowed extremist viewpoints to dominate. As a result, the conversation between Jewish Americans, particularly Orthodox and non-Orthodox, has become more fractured and toxic.

The majority of the seventeen people we interviewed said the worst harassment they received was from other Jewish people. In the words of one interview subject: “I am more afraid of other Jews than of non-Jews...I am concerned for the survival of the Jewish people in America. We are more at risk of imploding internally than from the outside.” This fear of harassment from others in the Jewish community has led to a spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann, 1974), in which moderate Jewish Americans do not feel able to speak out. Partisan division on Jewish issues may cause Jews who are

less political to become alienated from politics entirely—reducing Jewish participation in the national discourse. The profound relationship of Jews to Israel must not be reduced to an issue of partisan loyalty because of political complications created in the era of Trump. Our political conversation, in the new forms social media has given it, must allow Jewish Americans to speak without fear and must provide a space for the nuances of Jewish identity.

Increasing hostility—and violence—towards Jewish people is fomented in part by anti-Semitic conspiracies, which are metastasizing rapidly on social media. Of the 99,075 tweets in our sample that contained terms related to anti-Semitism, Jews, and Judaism, a staggering 54.10% contained terms that related to anti-Semitic conspiracies. Foremost among them was “Soros,” which was the most common word (excluding stop words) in the entire sample. Over 85% of the tweets containing the term “Soros” were anti-Semitic. Drawing from the QAnon conspiracy (and anti-Semitic conspiracies dating back to *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*), people described George Soros as an “evil man” who is using his vast wealth to control Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, and other members of the “deep state” to carry out world domination and “white genocide.” In recent months, these conspiracies have been cited in the manifestos of white supremacist terrorists responsible for shooting attacks in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Christchurch, New Zealand; and San Diego, California, among others. The conspiracies show no signs of abating.

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appendix I

Category	Hashtags
Extremist (22)	<p>“#NewRight”, “#AltRight”, “#NRx “, “#ItsOkToBeWhite”, “#proudboys”, “#8Chan”, “#WhiteGenocide”, “#nazis”, “#Hammerskins”, “#WhitePower”, “#WhitePride”, “#WWG1WGA”, “#QAnon”, “#Q”, “#QArmy”, “#TheStormIsHere”, “#Qanon8chan”, “#FollowTheWhiteRabbit”, “#EnjoyTheShow”, “#QanonArmy”, “#TheStorm”, “#TheGreatAwakening”</p>
Conservative (85)	<p>“#soros”, “#FuckAntifa”, “#MOLONLABE”, “#TheDonald”, “#DonaldTrump”, “#TrumpTrainPortal”, “#BuildTheWall”, “#KeepAmericaGreat”, “#JewsForTrump”, “#MAGA”, “#trump”, “#Republicans”, “#GOP”, “#Libertarian”, “#Anarchists”, “#tcot”, “#silentmajority”, “#NRA”, “#RedWave”, “#RedWaveRising”, “#RedWave2018”, “#RedWaveRising2018”, “#KAG2018”, “#KAG2020”, “#VoteRedToSaveAmerica”, “#TrumpTrain”, “#RedNation”, “#TrumpNation”, “#TrumpsArmy”, “#FakeNewsMedia”, “#FakeNewsCNN”, “#Redhat”, “#GoodbyeDemocrats”, “#PresidentTrump”, “#potus”, “#LatinosForTrump”, “#BlacksForTrump”, “#KAG”, “#MakeAmericaGreatAgain”, “#Trump2020”, “#KAG2020”, “#VoteRed2020”, “#TrumpSupporters”, “#WalkAway”, “#RedNationRising”, “#VoteRedOrAmericalsDead”, “#snowflake”, “#AmericaFirst”, “#draintheswamp”, “#VoteRed”, “#VoteDemsOut”, “#fuckHillary”, “#freealexjones”, “#CrookedHillary”, “#Neoliberals”, “#TeamTrump”, “#ReligiousRight”, “#VoteDemOut2018”, “#liberalmedia”, “#MediaBias”, “#EnemyOfThePeople”, “#PromisesKept”, “#ccot”, “#tlot “, “#TPOT”, “#GayConservative”, “#NeverVoteDemocratAgain”, “#ItsOkToBeMale “, “#MuellerWitchHunt”, “#PJNET”, “#BetterDeadThanRed”, “#WeThePeople”, “#DeepStateInPanic”, “#TrustThePlan”, “#TrustSessions”, “#ResistanceUnited”, “#PedoGate”, “#InsigniaGate”, “#PatriotsUnited”, “#jcot”, “#TeaParty”, “#Teabaggers”, “#NewWorldOrder”, “#NWO”, #magaveteran</p>
Liberal (97)	<p>#Dem”, “#Dems”, “#Liberals”, “#ProgressDems”, “#DNC”, “#BlueWave2018”, “#AntiFas”, “#takemoneyoutofpolitics”, “#TrumpKnew”, “#TrumpCult”, “#ImpeachTrump”, “#Impeach45”, “#VOTEBLUE”, “#VoteBlueToSaveAmerica”, “#VoteBlue2018”, “#votebuenomatterwho”, “#Resist”, “#theResistance”, “#Cult45”, “#TRE45ON”, “#UnfitToBePresident”, “#FoxFakeNews”, “#TrumpLies”, “#complicitgop”, “#corruptGOP”, “#PutinsPuppet”, “#RussiaGate”, “#PutinsPoodle”, “#RussianPuppet”, “#KremlinAnnex”, “#TrumpRussiaConspiracy”, “#TrumpRussiaCollusion”, “#crazytown”, “#TrumpRussia”, “#ProtectMueller”, “#MarchForTruth”, “#WhatsAtStake”, “#ProtectOurCare”, “#TakeltBack”, “#CultureOfCorruption”, “#RedToBlue”, “#riggedGOP”, “#NeverAgain”, “#BlueWave”, “#NeverTrump”, “#NotMyPresident”, “#Progressive”, “#FatNixon”, “#TrumpColluded”, “#25thAmendment”, “#LunaticInChief”, “#LockTrumpUp”, “#GOPCorruption”, “#GOPTraitors”, “#VoteOutGOP”, “#StrongerTogether”, “#dividedwefall”, “#FuckTrump”, “#CultureOfCorruption”, “#DemForce”, “#TrumpTreason”, “#TrumpLiesMatter”, “#LiarInChief”, “#DumpTrump”, “#TraitorInChief”, “#FakePresident”, “#TrumpResign”, “#TrumpCrimeFamily”, “#illegitimatePOTUS”, “#Treason”, “#ctl”, “#p2”, “#UniteBlue”, “#AlternativeFacts”, “#CommonSenseGunLaws”, “#MAGAts”, “#Deplorables”, “#FuckTheNRA”, “#AggressiveProgressives”, “#tytlive”, “#ANTIFA”, “#ElizabethWarren”, “#StillBerning”, “#feelthebern”, “#HindsightIs2020”, “#FollowBackResistance”, “#FBR”, “#FBRparty”, “#BlueTsunami”, “#BlueWave2018”, “#BlueTsunami2018”, “#BlueWaveComing2018”, “#VoteThemOut”, “#VoteThemOut2018”, “#MuellerTime”, “#WakeUpAmerica”, “#UnionStrong”</p>
Zionist/Anti-Zionist (11)	<p>“#AIPAC”, “#antiBDS”, “#zionists”, “#Birthright”, “#StandwithIsrael”, “#BDS”, “#NotJustAFreeTrip”, “#WeWillBeTheGeneration”, “#ifnotnow”, “#JewishResistance”, #israel</p>
Neutral (13)	<p>“#vote”, “#PrimaryDay”, “#2018Midterms”, “#Nov6”, “#1A”, “#2A”, «#GodblessAmerica”, “#jewishamerican”, “#MuellerInvestigation”, “#Mueller”, “#WhiteHouse”, “#SCOTUS”, “#WomensRights”</p>

appendix II

Terms categorized in relation to Jewish Americans

Term	Category	Number of Tweets
Soros	Derogatory	25137
Nazi	Irrelevant	21793
globalist	Lean Derog.	16237
Israeli	Context Dep.	7055
Hitler	Irrelevant	6651
Shill	Context Dep.	4902
globalism	Context Dep.	4362
Jewish	Context Dep.	2917
Jew	Context Dep.	2721
Holocaust	Context Dep.	2585
apartheid	Context Dep.	1978
Zionist	Lean Derog.	1916
NWO	Context Dep.	1837
shekel	Derogatory	1615
neo-Nazi	Irrelevant	1369
anti-Semitic	Neutral	1320
Rothschild	Derogatory	1059
Alt-right	Context Dep.	759
revisionist	Irrelevant	557
Reich	Irrelevant	358
Anti-white	Context Dep.	318
antisemitic	Neutral	271
kek	Irrelevant	193
Anti Semitic	Neutral	175
Heil	Irrelevant	147
Judas	Context Dep.	129

Term	Category	Number of Tweets
Orthodox	Neutral	101
Sieg	Irrelevant	68
Moloch	Context Dep.	68
gentile	Irrelevant	46
Aryan	Irrelevant	37
Kosher	Neutral	35
diaspora	Irrelevant	30
Shoah	Neutral	22
Non-Jew	Neutral	18
zionazi	Derogatory	17
goy	Derogatory	14
zios	Derogatory	12
joo	Context Dep.	11
dogwhistle	Neutral	11
idolaters	Context Dep.	7
Jewess	Neutral	7
JQ ¹	Derogatory	7
kekistan	Irrelevant	6
kapo	Context Dep.	5
kike	Derogatory	5
kapos	Context Dep.	5
1488	Irrelevant	2
shiksa	Lean Derog.	2
yid	Derogatory	1
shylock	Derogatory	1
ultra-orthodox	Neutral	1

1. JQ is an abbreviation of "Jewish Question."

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